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We examine the effect of IPO proceeds on the post-IPO information environment. We exploit variation 
in the amount of capital raised across IPOs that is unrelated to firm size and manager decisions using 
an instrumental variable approach, and find that marginal increases in IPO proceeds lead to large 
increases in analyst coverage and institutional ownership in the first two years a firm is public. 
Increases in IPO proceeds also lead to more frequent follow-on offerings and longer survival as a 
public firm. We find evidence that immediate shocks to ownership diversification represent one 
plausible channel through which changes in IPO proceeds affect long-run visibility and investor 






A high quality information environment is critical for newly public firms. Mehran and 
Peristiani (2010), Bharath and Dittmar (2010), and Mola, Rau, and Khorana (2013) find that failure 
to attract a critical mass of visibility and investor interest is a major reason firms abandon public 
markets. One way that IPO issuers can attract post-IPO visibility and interest is by reducing their 
offer price (i.e., increasing underpricing). Not only does underpricing attract media and investor 
attention (Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack, 2002), but it can also be used by issuers to attract 
analyst coverage.1 In this paper, we introduce and examine an alternative way for firms to attract 
post-IPO visibility and investor interest: the amount of IPO equity raised. 
An important but unanswered question in the IPO literature is how the amount of capital 
raised in an IPO affects post-IPO visibility. On the one hand, a lower offer price and share rationing 
reduce the amount of equity raised and increase aftermarket attention, which is consistent with 
literature suggesting the demand for IPO shares is inelastic.2 To this point, Booth and Chua (1999) 
find that oversubscription and high underpricing are associated with greater aftermarket demand and 
liquidity, and Demers and Lewellen (2003) find that high initial returns help generate website traffic.  
On the other hand, increasing the amount of capital raised may attract post-IPO visibility and 
investor interest by diversifying the shareholder base. Larger offerings are likely to expand the set of 
long-term institutional investors. Dispersed ownership can enhance visibility and investor interest 
directly through Merton (1987)’s investor recognition channel, and indirectly, through a liquidity 
channel whereby greater ownership dispersion improves liquidity, and greater liquidity increases 
investors’ incentive to learn about the firm (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993).3 Consistent with these 
theories, Lang, Lins, and Miller (2004) show that greater ownership dispersion can increase the 
equilibrium supply of analyst coverage, which is crucial for newly public firms (e.g., O’Brien and 
Tan 2015; Green, Jame, Markov, and Subasi 2014). 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Weber, Willenborg, and Yang (2018), Cliff and Denis (2004), and Rajan and Servaes (1997). 
2 See, e.g., Koh and Walter (1989) and Brennan and Franks (1997). 
3 Specifically, dispersed ownership increases the number of liquidity traders, and this increases incentives for 
informed traders to gather information and to trade (Kyle, 1984), which can attract visibility and interest. 
3 
 
There are several empirical challenges associated with identifying the effect of changes in the 
amount capital raised in an IPO on visibility, which stem from the correlation between offering size 
and unobserved factors, such as investment opportunities, investor demand, and firm size. To 
overcome these challenges, we introduce variation in IPO proceeds that is arguably exogenous to 
these factors to identify the effect of increased IPO equity on post-IPO visibility and investor interest. 
Specifically, we use 30-day post-IPO market returns as a shock to overallotment option exercise 
(OAE) (and in turn, the amount of IPO equity raised) that is unrelated to firm size or any decisions 
made during the IPO process.  
The overallotment (or greenshoe) option is a standard feature in firm-commitment IPOs that 
allows underwriters to increase the amount of equity raised in an IPO by up to 15% by purchasing 
shares from the issuer at the offer price anytime within 30 days of the IPO issue date. In practice, 
underwriters typically oversell the issue by at least 15% in the pre-market, meaning that the 
overallotment option amounts to a decision of how to buy back the additional shares sold short. If the 
issuer’s newly issued shares trade above the IPO offer price, it is optimal for underwriters to fully 
exercise the overallotment option and cover the entire pre-IPO short position via direct purchase of 
shares from the firm, leading to a higher amount of equity raised (see e.g., Chen and Ritter, 2000). If 
the firm’s shares trade at or below the offer price in the aftermarket, underwriters will likely not 
exercise the full (or any of) the option, leading to a lower amount of IPO equity raised. 
Our empirical strategy is to first document the effect of IPO proceeds on long-run measures 
of visibility and investor interest, specifically, sell-side analyst coverage and the fraction of shares 
held by institutional owners one and two years after the IPO. We then examine whether any effect 
that IPO proceeds has on long-run visibility and investor interest appears to be due in part to the 
immediate impact IPO proceeds has on ownership dispersion and market liquidity. 
In our first set of empirical tests, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) to regress long-run post-
IPO visibility and investor interest on both the dollar amount of pre-overallotment IPO proceeds and 
the overallotment exercise (OAE). Both measures of offering amount are positively associated with 
our measures of visibility and investor interest. However, this OLS evidence cannot be interpreted 
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causally, because it does not account for potential correlated omitted variables. Although the regression 
controls for factors such as firm size and IPO underpricing, it does not control for other (unobservable) 
factors, such as IPO quality, investment opportunities, underwriter price support, and retail investor 
demand.  
To better identify the casual effect of IPO offering amount, we use NASDAQ returns in the 
first thirty days after a firm’s IPO as an instrument for OAE in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
framework.4 Our instrument captures the non-idiosyncratic component of firms’ 30-day post-IPO 
returns, which is exogenous to firm characteristics, and also to decisions made at the time of the IPO.5 
We first show that the NASDAQ returns during the overallotment period are a strong predictor of OAE 
(with a t-statistic of 5.23). We next show that this relation only holds within the half of IPOs that we 
estimate would have traded nearest to the IPO offer price during the first thirty days of trading in the 
absence of market returns. We refer to this half of IPO issuers as the OAE sensitive sample. Within 
the OAE sensitive sample, a one standard deviation increase in 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns 
predicts a 3% increase in the amount of equity raised. Because our identification strategy requires post-
IPO NASDAQ returns to significantly affect OAE, we conduct the majority of our analyses on the 
OAE sensitive sample.6  
Our exclusion restriction requires that, after controlling for long-run (i.e., one-year) post-IPO 
NASDAQ returns, 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns do not affect long-run post-IPO visibility and 
investor interest except to the extent that they affect OAE. This assumption is supported by the fact 
that 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns are beyond the control of managers. Consistent with this, 30-
day post-IPO NASDAQ returns are unrelated to essentially all pre-IPO-firm and IPO characteristics.7 
However, our exclusion restriction is violated if a general relation exists between NASDAQ returns 
immediately following a firm’s IPO date and future firm-specific visibility and investor interest. 
                                                          
4 Our empirical strategy is similar to Bernstein (2015), who uses NASDAQ returns to instrument for IPO completion. 
5 This idea is similar to that used in the CEO pay-for-luck literature when proxying for the component of stock returns 
that are exogenous to managerial decisions (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Garvey and Milbourn, 2006).                            
6 Using the full sample provides qualitatively similar results.  
7 We examine the relation between our instrument and fifteen firm and IPO characteristics and only one (cash-to-
assets) is statistically significant at the 5% level or better.  
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Although such a relation is possible ex-ante, the placebo tests presented in Figure 1 below reveal no 
significant relation between long-run analyst coverage or institutional ownership percentage and 
NASDAQ returns either in the weeks before the IPO or in the weeks after the overallotment expiration. 
In contrast, Figure 1 indicates a strong relation between post-IPO NASDAQ returns in the first 30 days 
and long-run analyst coverage and institutional ownership. Moreover, additional analyses indicate that 
this relation only exists in the OAE sensitive sample. Thus, post-IPO overallotment-period NASDAQ 
returns are uniquely related to post-IPO analyst coverage and institutional ownership in a manner 
consistent with our exclusion restriction. 
Figure 1:  10-Day NASDAQ Return Windows Predicting Long-Run post-IPO Visibility   
 
This figure plots estimates of the relation between post-IPO visibility and twelve 10-day NASDAQ return 
buckets surrounding a firm’s IPO date. We regress the natural log of the number of analysts covering the firm 
(solid line), and the natural log of the percentage of institutional ownership (dashed) in the second year of trading 
on 10-day NASDAQ returns ending on the day indicated on the x-axis (where day 0 is the IPO issue day). The 
figure plots the coefficient on each NASDAQ return bucket. The left y-axis represents the percent change in 
each measure for a 1% increase in the respective 10-day NASDAQ return. The sample is restricted to the OAE 
sensitive sample and all regressions include the IPO and firm-level control variables listed in Appendix A1.  
 
Under our identifying assumptions, the second stage 2SLS coefficients provide estimates of 
the causal effect of OAE, and the amount of equity raised, on post-IPO financial visibility. In our main 
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results, we show that increasing the amount of equity raised in an IPO results in a significant and 
economically large increase in visibility and investor interest one and two years after an IPO. 
Measuring firm outcomes one year after the IPO, we estimate that a 1% increase in the amount of 
equity raised results in a 3% increase in the number of analysts, and a 3% increase in institutional 
ownership percentage. These effects intensify throughout the first two years firms are public. For 
instance, the effect of a 1% increase in offering size on analyst coverage increases from approximately 
2% six months after the IPO to over 3.5% two years after the IPO.  
We then provide evidence that one reason increasing the size of an IPO increases investor 
interest is that it provides an initial shock to ownership dispersion and market liquidity. A 1% increase 
in the amount of capital raised in an IPO increases the number of institutional investors by 4.5% and 
reduces bid-ask spreads by about 6% as of the second post-IPO filing.8 Our evidence is consistent with 
the predictions of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) in that there are linkages between liquidity, ownership 
dispersion, and investor interest. These results suggest that small variations in the amount of IPO equity 
raised can have significant and persistent effects on newly public firms.   
In our final set of tests, we examine whether increasing the amount of IPO equity raised 
changes the way newly public firms interact with public markets. We begin by investigating how the 
amount of IPO equity raised affects subsequent equity issuance. Although exogenously increasing the 
amount of equity raised during an IPO may reduce a firm’s demand for equity, we find that increasing 
initial offering size increases a firm’s issuance of future equity. These findings are consistent with 
existing literature suggesting that enhanced visibility reduces the cost of raising equity (see e.g., 
Bowen, Chen, and Cheng, 2008). We also find that the amount of initial equity raised is an important 
determinant of how long a firm remains publicly traded. Hazard model estimates reveal a positive 
relation between 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns and issuers’ life expectancy, while NASDAQ 
returns in subsequent 30-day periods do not share this relation. Likewise, two-stage estimates reveal a 
positive relation between IPO offering amount and survival as a public firm. Thus, not only does the 
                                                          
8 The first post-IPO filing can occur before the end of the overallotment period. 
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amount of initial capital raised influence the propensity of future equity issuances, it also increases the 
likelihood that a firm retains access to public equity markets.  
 Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the literature on 
the benefits of public market access. Mehran and Peristiani (2009) establish the importance of post-
IPO visibility and investor interest for retaining access to public markets. We show that post-IPO 
visibility and investor interest are positively linked to the amount of equity raised in an IPO, and one 
reason for this relation is the immediate effect that increases in offering size have on ownership 
dispersion and liquidity. Other determinants discussed in the existing literature as relating to post-IPO 
visibility and investor interest include IPO underpricing (Booth and Chua, 1996; Cliff and Denis, 2004; 
Ljungqvist, 2005), and the number and quality of underwriters (Jeon, Lee, Nasser, Via, 2015). Our 
results are distinct from the effect of underpricing and underwriter quality, as we use exogenous 
variation in offering amount unrelated to underwriter selection and IPO pricing (and we focus on firms 
with low to moderate underpricing). To our knowledge, we provide the first direct evidence of the 
consequences to changes in the amount of equity raised in an IPO.  
Second, we add to literature on post-IPO analyst coverage in particular, and post-IPO visibility, 
more generally. Prior work emphasizes the importance of analyst coverage for enhancing firm 
reputation and lowering the cost of equity (e.g., James and Karceski, 2006; Pagano et al., 1998; Li and 
You 2015; O’Brien and Tan, 2015). Regulators also value the role of analysts for newly public firms, 
passing the JOBS Act in 2012 to stimulate more analyst coverage for IPO firms (IPO Task Force 2011; 
Dambra, Field, Gustafson, and Pisciotta, 2018). Our study shows that the amount of equity raised in 
an IPO as another way through which firms can attract greater analyst coverage. Interestingly, our 
evidence also suggests that analysts can benefit from covering these firms. Firms with (exogenously 
determined) increases in IPO proceeds are more likely to conduct future equity offerings, providing 
opportunities for future investment banking and brokerage fees (Krigman, Shaw, and Womack, 2001).          
Finally, by showing that random fluctuations in post-IPO market returns significantly predict 
long-run post-IPO visibility and investor interest, we contribute to the growing literature highlighting 
the importance of serendipitous shocks for the trajectory of corporations and individuals. For example, 
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Bernstein (2015) shows that short-term market fluctuations following a firm’s IPO filing affect the 
probability of going public, and in turn, long-run innovation, while Oyer (2006, 2008), Kahn (2010), 
Oreopoulos, Wachter, and Heisz (2012), and Schoar and Zuo (2017) all document sizeable and 
persistent effects of economic conditions during the time of college graduation on initial job placement, 
and subsequent career progression. 
2. Data Description and Preliminary Analysis 
Our sample begins with all U.S. firm-commitment IPOs in Thomson One’s New Issues 
Database between 1996 and 2012. The sample starts in 1996 because that is the first year for which the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 
(EDGAR) system regularly provides IPO prospectuses and post-IPO quarterly filings. The sample ends 
in 2012 so that we have sufficient time to observe post-IPO outcomes.9 We exclude unit offerings, 
foreign issues, and all deals with SIC codes: 6091, 6371, 6722, 6726, 6732, 6733, and 6799. This 
results in a sample of 2,947 IPOs with non-missing values for all control variables and post-IPO firm 
and industry returns. Our analyses investigating post-IPO outcomes have slightly smaller sample sizes 
due to delistments and missing dependent variables. For example, 2,837 firms remain public through 
their fifth post-IPO quarterly filing, at which point we measure year one outcomes, and 2,502 survive 
an additional year, at which point we measure year two outcomes.  
2.1  Measuring amount of IPO equity raised via the Overallotment Option 
We first measure the amount of IPO equity raised as the dollar value of proceeds that a firm 
raises in the IPO, as reported by Thomson One, before accounting for underwriter fees or overallotment 
proceeds. This measure approximates the (pre-overallotment) post-IPO public float. We transform this 
measure by converting it to 2012 dollars and taking the natural log. Although the existing literature 
frequently includes such a variable as a control, it is rarely the subject of much discussion (see e.g., 
Rajan and Servaes, 1997; Field and Lowry, 2009). In fact, Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2014) do not 
control for IPO proceeds at all when examining whether media attention affects long-run investor 
                                                          
9 This keeps our sample constant for year one outcomes, given that we only have institutional ownership data through 
the end of 2013. For second-year institutional ownership outcomes, the sample is slightly smaller. 
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recognition, electing instead to control for firm size via the natural log of total assets. One reason that 
many studies do not discuss the relation between IPO proceeds and various outcomes of interest is that 
the OLS coefficient is difficult to interpret. The coefficient on IPO proceeds may capture the effect of 
firm size, investor demand, or a firm’s demand for capital.  
We circumvent these confounding effects using an empirical strategy centered on the 
overallotment option exercise (OAE) as a second source of variation in the amount of equity raised. 
The overallotment option, which is present in virtually all US IPOs over the past several decades, 
allows an underwriter to increase the amount of equity raised in an IPO by up to 15% by purchasing 
shares from the issuer at the offer price anytime within 30 days of the IPO date. Ellis, Michaely, and 
O’Hara (2000) note that the overallotment decision is typically carried out by the lead underwriter on 
behalf of the underwriting syndicate. Since the lead underwriter almost always oversells the issue by 
at least 15 percent in the pre-market, the overallotment option amounts to a decision of how the 
underwriter will buy back the additional shares sold short. If the firm’s newly issued shares trade above 
the IPO offer price, it is optimal for the underwriter to exercise the overallotment option by purchasing 
shares from the firm at the IPO offer price to cover their pre-IPO short position (see e.g., Chen and 
Ritter, 2000). If the firm’s shares trade at or below the offer price in the aftermarket, the underwriter 
will likely cover at least some of the short position by providing price support and buying up shares in 
the secondary market (Aggarwal 2000).  
Our primary data source for overallotment information is the Thomson One database. 
However, because the data are frequently missing, we supplement Thomson One’s reporting of OAE 
with hand-collection. In addition to searching IPO prospectuses, we search the first several post-IPO 
quarterly filings, which often disclose the number of additional shares purchased from the firm by the 
underwriter following the IPO.10  
                                                          
10 In many cases, the OAE is split between primary and secondary shares in the same proportion as the IPO. To the 
extent that the split differs, OAE may still accurately reflect the split that would have occurred had the pre-
overallotment IPO proceeds been increased. An exception to this would be if insiders could opportunistically sell more 
(or less) secondary shares depending on the market returns over the first 30-days. To our knowledge this practice is 
not common. Notably, since we observe secondary shares as of the prospectus, our measurement is not subject to the 
concern raised in Ang and Brau (2003) that insiders sometimes conceal the amount of secondary shares offered 
through pre-IPO amendments. 
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2.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the variables used throughout our analysis. 
To ensure that outliers do not influence our inferences, all (non-return) continuous variables that are 
not logged are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%.11 Unreported tests indicate that results are nearly 
identical without winsorization. 
On average, OAE increases the amount of IPO equity raised by 11%. Unreported statistics 
indicate that the overallotment option is fully exercised in over 60% of IPOs and not exercised at all in 
23% of IPOs, with the remaining OAEs being approximately uniformly distributed between 0% and 
15%. In 2012 dollars, the average IPO firm raises approximately $153 million (pre-overallotment) and 
has $964 million in pre-IPO assets. The distributions of IPO proceeds and total assets are positively 
skewed as the median IPO firm raises $66 million and has total assets of $40 million. On average, 89% 
of IPO proceeds come from primary shares. Finally, the average IPO issuer is unprofitable, with a 
return on assets of negative 29 percent. Consistent with existing literature, the average (median) IPO 
issuer’s stock price goes up by 27% (11%) on the first day of trading.  
Panel B provides descriptive statistics on the post-IPO measures of ownership dispersion, 
liquidity, and long-run visibility we use as dependent variables throughout the analysis. Ownership 
dispersion and liquidity are measured and presented as of the second post-IPO quarterly filing. More 
specifically, ownership dispersion measures the number of 13F filers holding the stock as of the second 
post-IPO filing, and liquidity measures the average daily closing bid-ask spread from the second to the 
third post-IPO filing. Analyst coverage and institutional ownership percentage statistics are measured 
as of the end of the first and second full post-IPO filing years. On average, IPO issuers have 
approximately 37 institutional owners as the second post-IPO quarterly filing, and an average bid-ask 
spread of approximately 2%. During the first year of being public, the average firm is covered by 
between 5.5 analysts, which grows to 7.5 analysts in the second year. Additionally, at the end of the 
first year, the typical IPO firm is 36% owned by institutions, which grows to 41% by the end of the 
                                                          
11 One exception is our measures of liquidity (bid-ask spread and Amihud illiquidity) to which we apply 2.5% 
winsorization to account for a larger propensity of outliers. Results are similar, albeit with higher standard errors, 
using 1% (or zero) winsorization. 
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second year. Firms conduct SEOs approximately 22% (16%) of the time in the first (second) year they 
are public. Conditional on conducting an SEO, firms raise approximately $330 million, resulting in the 
average firm raising approximately $72 and $56 million in SEO proceeds during the first and second 
year after they go public.  Lastly, 12% of issuers delist within two years. See Appendix A1 for formal 
variable definitions.  
2.3. The OLS Association between IPO proceeds and Investor and Analyst Attention 
Attracting attention from analysts and investors is critical to a newly public firm’s ability to 
benefit from public markets (Mehran and Peristiani, 2009). In Table 2, we provide some preliminary 
evidence on how post-IPO visibility and investor interest are influenced by the amount of equity raised 
in an IPO. We regress measures of long-horizon post-IPO visibility and investor interest one year and 
two years after the IPO on both OAE and the inflation adjusted dollar amount of IPO proceeds (Ln(Pre-
OAE Proceeds)). We use analyst coverage and the percent of institutional ownership as our primary 
measures of post-IPO visibility and investor interest, which Mehran and Peristiani (2010), Bharath and 
Dittmar (2010), and O’Brien and Tan (2015), among others, argue are critical dimensions of visibility 
and interest for firms to maintain a viable cost of equity.  
Across the first two columns of Table 2, we find a strong association between the two measures 
of IPO equity raised and first year analyst coverage and institutional ownership. We find similar results 
in columns two and three of Table 2 when we examine the effect of issuance size on second year post-
IPO outcomes. The economic magnitude implied by the coefficients on the OAE and IPO proceeds are 
economically large. For instance, Column 3 suggests that a 1% increase in inflation adjusted (pre-
overallotment) IPO proceeds is associated with a 0.3% increase in the number of analysts. The 
coefficient on OAE indicates similar, but larger, effects.12  
Although these OLS estimates report a positive relation between IPO proceeds and post-IPO 
visibility and investor interest, they must be interpreted cautiously as the OLS coefficients could be 
                                                          
12 Unreported tests suggest that these effects are robust to alternative measures of longer-horizon post-IPO visibility 




biased upwards or downwards. The relation between IPO proceeds and one-year post-IPO visibility 
could be overstated due to the correlation between IPO proceeds and firm size, since firm size is 
positively related to analyst coverage and institutional ownership. Alternatively, there are reverse 
causality reasons that the OAE coefficient could be understated. First instance, low levels of 
institutional ownership could be correlated with the overallotment option triggering because non-
institutional (i.e., retail) investors tend to overpay for shares of newly public firms (see e.g., Dorn, 
2009; Derrien, 2005; Ljungqvist et al., 2006), causing more frequent OAE when institutional 
ownership and analyst coverage is low. In the next section, we move to a discussion of how we identify 
the relation between IPO proceeds and post-IPO visibility and investor interest via plausibly exogenous 
variation in the amount of capital raised in an IPO. 
3. Identification Strategy 
To address the endogenous relationship between the amount of equity raised in an IPO and 
other issuer and IPO characteristics, we exploit the fact that OAE, and in turn the amount of IPO 
equity raised, is partially determined by factors outside the control of management and 
underwriters. As discussed in Section 2.1, the main driver of OAE is the firm’s returns during the 
30-day period in which underwriters are deciding whether or not to exercise the overallotment 
option. Although IPO pricing and underwriter price support significantly affect a firm’s returns 
during this period, a portion of these 30-day returns is driven by market conditions, which are 
completely outside the control of managers and underwriters. Thus, initial post-IPO market returns 
represent quasi-random variation in OAE. In this section, we explain how we use this variation to 
instrument for OAE in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework.  
3.1. Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
To identify the effect of the amount of IPO equity raised on post-IPO visibility and investor 
interest, we conduct 2SLS analysis where we use 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns as an 
instrumental variable (IV) for overallotment exercise, denoted as OAE. In our first stage, we 
regress OAE, ranging between 0.00 and 0.15, on NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] and a variety of control 
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variables illustrated in Eq. 1 below: 
𝑂𝐴𝐸 = 𝛼1𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑄 𝑅𝑒𝑡.[0,29]+ 𝛼2𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑄 𝑅𝑒𝑡.[−180,−1]+ α3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑡.[0]+  
      𝛼4𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑄 𝑅𝑒𝑡.[0,360]+ Σ a𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜃𝐹𝐹49 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀                                                 (1)  
We expect the firm’s returns in the first 30 days after going public to be the primary driver 
of OAE. NASDAQ Ret.[0,29], our IV, isolates the portion of firm performance that is beyond 
managers’ control. In general, Eq. 1 regresses OAE on variables determined before the end of the 
overallotment period. The only explanatory variable measured after this period is the first-year 
NASDAQ returns. Results are not sensitive to dropping this control from the analysis; however, 
we include it in our main specification to control for the possibility that our second stage outcomes 
of first and second-year visibility and investor interest are directly related to market conditions. 
We also control for pre-IPO market returns (NASDAQ Ret.[-180,-1]) to capture the effect of hot-
markets on the IPO process and subsequent outcomes (Alti, 2006).   
Eq. 1 also includes additional pre-IPO control variables, including fixed effects for both 
Fama-French 49 industries (𝜃𝐹𝐹49) and the year-quarter of IPO issuance (𝜑𝑡). Firm-level pre-IPO 
controls include ln(assets); ln(firm age); ln(market-to-book), cash-to-assets; net income-to-assets; 
sales-to-assets; debt-to-assets; property, plant and equipment to assets; and 30-day pre-IPO media 
mentions. We also include several deal characteristics, such as indicators for a venture capital or 
private equity backed offering, the number of bookrunners, and the percentage of primary shares 
sold. Appendix A1 includes formal definitions of all variables we use throughout the analysis.  
Eq. 2 formalizes the second stage regression:  
 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑌𝑟 𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑂𝐴𝐸 ̂ + 𝛽2𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑄 𝑅𝑒𝑡.[−180,−1]+ 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑡.[0]+
𝛽4𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑄 𝑅𝑒𝑡.[0,360]+ Σ b𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜃𝐹𝐹49 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀                                                          (2)  
Here, we regress post-IPO measures of visibility and investor interest (i.e., analyst coverage and 
institutional ownership), measured either one or two years after the IPO, denoted 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑌𝑟 𝑡, on 
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the predicted value of OAE from Eq. 1, 𝑂𝐴𝐸 ̂ . In the accompanying analysis in which we try to 
understand the relation between OAE and longer-run visibility and investor interest, we also 
regress measures of immediate post-IPO ownership dispersion and liquidity (i.e., number 
institutional holders and bid-ask spread) on the predicted value of OAE from Eq. 1.  
We include the same set of controls from Eq. 1 in Eq. 2, minus our IV, NASDAQ Ret.[0,29]. 
We correct the second stage standard errors for the presence of a generated regressor and cluster 
standard errors at the year-quarter level.13 Again, our one- and two-year outcomes of interest of 
analyst coverage and institutional ownership are used to capture post-IPO visibility and investor 
interest. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽1, which approximates the effect of increasing OAE by 100 
percent. Since OAE ranges from 0 to 0.15, a reasonable way to interpret 𝛽1 is to divide it by 100 
and view it as a linear approximation of the effect of increasing IPO equity raised by 1%.  
3.2. Localizing our Identification Strategy  
The thirty day post-IPO market returns (NASDAQ Ret.[0,29]) should only affect OAE to the 
extent that the IPO issuer’s stock would have traded near the IPO offer price (i.e., the threshold at 
which it becomes optimal for underwriters to exercise the overallotment option) in the absence of 
market returns. Under the assumptions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), firms that fit 
this description will be ones with values of |𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠[0,29] −  𝛽 ∗ (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠[0,29])| 
that are closest to zero.  
We empirically estimate the sample of firms that theoretically would have traded closest 
to their offer price in the absence of market returns in two ways. The main empirical challenge in 
arriving at such a sample is estimating the IPO firm’s beta, 𝛽. For seasoned firms, 𝛽 is typically 
estimated in some period prior to the event being examined. This is not possible for IPO firms 
since there is no high frequency price data prior to the IPO. The first way we address this data 
limitation is to use a cross-sectional 𝛽, estimated by regressing IPO firms’ initial 30-day returns 
                                                          




on initial 30-day NASDAQ returns; the beta is the estimated coefficient on 30-day NASDAQ 
returns. An important benefit to this cross-sectional 𝛽 is that it captures the potentially unique way 
that IPO firms’ returns covary with market returns during the first 30 days they are public. The 
limitation is that every IPO firm is assumed to have the same 𝛽. 
An alternative approach is to construct a firm-specific beta using a matched seasoned firm. 
The intuition behind this follows directly from studies examining long-run abnormal returns for 
IPO issuers, which benchmark IPO issuers to seasoned firms that are similar in terms of size and 
book-to-market.14 We follow this literature by matching each IPO issuer to the seasoned firm (i.e., 
a firm that has been public for at least four years) within a 30% market capitalization band with 
the most similar book-to-market ratio to the IPO issuer. Our firm-specific beta equals the 
coefficient on NASDAQ returns obtained from regressing the daily returns of the matched 
seasoned firm on NASDAQ returns during the 360 days ending the day prior to the IPO date.   
In our subsequent analysis, we consider the OAE sensitive sample as IPOs for which 
|𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠[0,30] −  𝛽 ∗ (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠[0,30])| is below the sample median. Appendix A2 
presents descriptive statistics for OAE sensitive issuers compared to other issuers. In unreported 
multiple regressions, we find that the biggest determinant of whether an IPO issuer ends up in the 
OAE sensitive sample is IPO underpricing. OAE sensitive firms have average (median) 
underpricing of 8% (5%), compared to 44% (25%) in the non-sensitive sample. This is not 
surprising, since it is unlikely that an issuer’s price will linger around the IPO offer price if first 
day returns are extremely high. This is also notable because earlier studies find that leaving money 
on the table through underpriced shares is one way issuers can attract visibility in the aftermarket. 
Our focus on OAE sensitive firms provides the additional benefit of limiting the influence of 
underpricing by focusing on the subsample of IPOs for which underpricing is relatively low. Many 
of the other descriptive differences between OAE sensitive and non-sensitive IPO issuers are 
                                                          
14 See e.g., Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999); Ritter and Welch (2002); Brau, Couch, and Sutton (2012); Lowry, 
Michaely, and Volkova (2017). 
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characteristics, such as size, that are correlated with IPO underpricing. OAE sensitive issuers are 
bigger, less likely to be VC backed, and have lower market-to-book ratios.  
The differences between the OAE sensitive issuers and other issuers are not problematic 
for our identification strategy. However, it is important to remember when interpreting our results. 
To the extent that 𝛽 is appropriately measured, we expect OAE sensitive firms to exhibit a more 
positive relation (as compared to OAE insensitive firms) between OAE and 30-day post-IPO 
NASDAQ returns in the first stage.  
3.3. Evidence on Identifying Assumptions  
Interpreting 𝛽1 in Eq. 2 above as the causal effect of OAE on post-IPO visibility and 
investor interest is only appropriate to the extent that the identifying assumptions of 2SLS are met. 
The first of these assumptions (i.e., the relevance condition) states that NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] is a 
relevant predictor of OAE. The second (i.e., the exclusion restriction) states that NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] 
does not predict post-IPO visibility and investor interest for reasons other than its effect on OAE.  
 3.3.1 Relevance of Instrument   
We begin by examining the relevance of our IV, NASDAQ Ret.[0,29], as a predictor of OAE. 
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] is a significant predictor of OAE when 
estimating Eq. 1 over the full sample.  The t-statistic on NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] of 5.23 suggests that 
our IV is sufficiently strong. Squaring this t-statistic yields an F-statistic of over 25 and Stock and 
Yogo (2005) show that the potential bias of the IV estimate attributable to weak instruments can 
be at most 10% when the first-stage F-statistic is over 16. As expected, IPO underpricing – a 
component of the firm’s returns during the first 30 days – is another highly significant predictor 
of OAE. Unreported tests (1) suggest that the estimated effect remains significant and of similar 




In Columns 2 and 3, we partition the sample based on whether we expect an IPO to have 
high or low sensitivity of OAE to NASDAQ Ret.[0,29], according to the cross-sectional 𝛽 approach 
discussed in Section 3.2. As expected, we find that OAE is more sensitive to post-IPO market 
returns in the OAE sensitive sample (i.e., the sample for which we estimate the stock price would 
have lingered around the offer price in the absence of any market returns). Comparing Column 2 
to Column 1, the coefficient on NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] almost triples and the t-statistic increases to 
6.74. The coefficient of 0.335 in Column 2 suggests that a one standard deviation (or 0.07 point) 
increase in NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] predicts an approximately 3 percentage point higher probability of 
OAE. In contrast, Column 3 indicates no statistically significant relation between NASDAQ 
Ret.[0,29] and OAE for the OAE insensitive sample. Thus, the cross-sectional 𝛽 approach appears 
to successfully identify IPO firms whose OAE decision is sensitive to post-IPO market conditions.  
In Columns 4 and 5 we split the sample based on the expected sensitivity of OAE to 
NASDAQ Ret.[0,29], according to the firm-specific 𝛽 approach. Again, we find that the coefficient 
on NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] is almost twice as large in the high OAE sensitive sample in Column 4 versus 
the low OAE sensitive sample in Column 5. However, the firm-specific beta sample partition does 
not split as precisely on OAE sensitivity as the cross-sectional beta partition. As such, we use the 
OAE sensitive sample constructed using the cross-sectional beta, i.e., Column 2 of Table 3, as our 
localized sample throughout the remainder of our analysis.15  
3.3.2. Evidence on the Exclusion Restriction  
Our exclusion restriction requires that 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns do not affect 
post-IPO visibility or investor interest for any reason other than through their effect on OAE. This 
assumption seems reasonable, because 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns are independent of firm 
and IPO characteristics and beyond the control of managers. However, our exclusion restriction is 
violated if a general relation exists between NASDAQ returns following a firm’s IPO and future 
                                                          




firm visibility and investor interest. Atanasov and Black (2017) argue that three ways to enhance 
the credibility of a 2SLS procedure are (1) to conduct direct plug-in (or difference-in-differences) 
estimations in which second stage outcomes are regressed directly on the IV, (2) to conduct 
falsification or placebo tests, and (3) to ensure covariate balance between the treated and non-
treated observations. Below we examine the validity of our identifying assumptions along these 
three dimensions.   
We begin by regressing one-year post-IPO visibility and investor interest on NASDAQ 
returns in the first, second, and third month after a firm goes public. This analysis provides both a 
direct plug-in estimation of the relation between our IV and the second stage outcomes (i.e., point 
(1) above), as well as a placebo test that examines whether there is a general relation between post-
IPO NASDAQ returns and our second stage outcomes (i.e., point (2) above). To the extent that the 
amount of equity raised in an IPO affects the degree to which IPO issuers can attract a critical 
amount of visibility and investor interest, we expect the first month’s NASDAQ returns to be 
significantly related to post-IPO visibility and interest. However, a significant relation between the 
second- and third-month’s NASDAQ returns and post-IPO interest would cast doubt on the 
validity of our exclusion restriction.  
Regressions in the first two columns of Table 4 examine the sample of firms for which 
OAE is sensitive to 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns. Results in both columns indicate a 
significant relation between immediate post-IPO 30-day NASDAQ returns and our measures of 
long-run visibility and investor interest.16 A one standard deviation (or 7 percentage point) increase 
in 30-day NASDAQ returns predicts roughly a 10% increase in both the number of analysts 
covering a firm and institutional ownership percentage during the first year it is public. In contrast, 
none of the other four coefficients on NASDAQ Ret.[30,59] and NASDAQ Ret.[60,89] are significant.
17  
                                                          
16 We find qualitatively similar results using the natural log of the number of analyst forecasts, share turnover, and 
breadth of institutional ownership. 
17 Unreported tests examining 30 day returns prior to the IPO provides similar (null) results, although these findings 
are subject to a possible selection issue whereby certain types of IPO issuers time their IPO relative to recent returns. 
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Figure 1 (which we discuss in the introduction) and Figure 2 decompose the results in Panel 
A of Table 4. These figures examine how NASDAQ returns during various 5 and 10 day buckets 
around a firm’s IPO relate to longer-run post-IPO visibility and investor interest. In Figure 2, we 
replicate the regression from Table 4, but replace NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] with 5-day increments (e.g, 
NASDAQ Ret.[0,5], NASDAQ Ret.[6,10], etc.). Visually, we observe a discontinuity in the relation 
between post-IPO visibility and post-IPO NASDAQ returns right at the end of the overallotment 
option period, 30 days after the IPO. In particular, there is a significant positive relation between 
NASDAQ returns and one-year analyst coverage and institutional holding percentage through the 
end of the overallotment period. Such a relation does not exist for NASDAQ returns measured 
during any of the adjacent periods. As we discuss in the introduction, Figure 1 presents estimates 
using a similar approach, but with ten day windows, before and after the IPO. Again, we observe 
no relation between our measures of post-IPO visibility and investor interest and NASDAQ returns 
in the pre- or post-OAE windows, but significant relations during the OAE period. These figures 
show that there is something unique about the relation between market returns during the first 30 
days a firm is public and long-run post-IPO visibility and investor interest.  
To further examine whether the increased probability of OAE is the driver of the unique 
relation between 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns and post-IPO visibility and investor interest, 
we next investigate whether the relation persists when OAE is not sensitive to post-IPO NASDAQ 
returns. Specifically, in Columns 3-4 of Table 4, we replicate the analysis in Columns 1-2 using 
the OAE non-sensitive sample (i.e., the sample from Column 3 of Table 3).  Neither of the 
coefficients on NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] are statistically significant, and both are less than 25% of the 
magnitude of the corresponding coefficients in Columns 1-2. We find similar evidence of 
insignificant relations between second and third month market returns (i.e., NASDAQ Ret.[30,59] 
and NASDAQ Ret.[60,89]) and post-IPO outcomes.  
We also follow the recommendation in Atanasov and Black (2017) to examine whether our 
IV is related to firm characteristics, which is our setting’s equivalent to covariate balance among 
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treated and control firms (i.e., point (3) above). To accomplish this, we conduct a series of 
univariate regressions where the dependent variables are the firm characteristics that we control 
for in Table 2 (i.e., Ln(Firm Age), Ln(Assets), Ln(MtB), Cash/Assets, Net Income/Assets, 
Sale/Assets, Total Debt/Assets, PP&E/Assets, Media Attn.) and the lone independent variable is 
the 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns. Out of these nine regressions, only cash to assets is 
significantly related to 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns at the 5% level or better. We conduct a 
similar exercise using IPO characteristics. We find no significant relation between our IV and 
Ln(Pre-OAE Proceeds), VC-Backed, PE-Backed, % Primary, or Lead Managers. This evidence 
suggests that firms exposed to positive and negative post-IPO NASDAQ returns shocks are 
similar, which empirically supports the claim that post-IPO NASDAQ returns are beyond the 
control and predictive ability of management, underwriters, and pre-IPO investors.  
Taken together, the evidence in Table 4 and Figures 1 and 2 is consistent with our exclusion 
restriction. A violation of our exclusion restriction would entail some non-OAE channel through 
which 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns predict post-IPO outcomes that a) must also explain 
why the relation between post-IPO outcomes and NASDAQ returns in subsequent months fails to 
exist and b) why the relation between 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ and longer-run outcomes is 
concentrated in the OAE sensitive sample.  
Although we view such an alternative explanation as unlikely, we do consider the 
possibility that 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns uniquely generate media attention, which then 
cascades (only for OAE sensitive firms) into more favorable post-IPO firm visibility and other 
related outcomes. To test the plausibility of this channel, we follow Liu, Sherman, and Zhang 
(2014) and measure media attention as the number of news articles mentioning the firm that are 
released in the public press immediately after a firm goes public. Specifically, we conduct Factiva 
searches for the number of articles that mention the firm, published from relevant outlets during 
the first 30 days. In Appendix A3, we regress this measure of media attention on post-IPO 
NASDAQ returns within our OAE sensitive sample. The coefficients on 30-day post-IPO 
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NASDAQ returns are insignificant, with t-statistics around -1. In addition, Liu, Sherman, and 
Zhang (2014) show that media attention in the month prior to going public predicts post-IPO 
outcomes and we find no relation between pre-IPO NASDAQ returns and long-run post-IPO 
outcomes.  
The evidence in this section suggests that our identifying assumptions are plausible. Under 
these assumptions, we interpret 𝛽1 in Equation 2 as the causal effect of the amount of equity raised 
in an IPO (through OAE) on post-IPO visibility and investor interest. 
4. Effect of IPO Proceeds on Visibility and Investor Interest 
In this section, we use the 2SLS framework discussed in Section 3 to identify the marginal 
effect of IPO proceeds on post-IPO visibility and investor interest. While prior evidence suggests 
that constraining price or quantity of new equity shares is often rewarded with aftermarket 
attention, expanding the size of a new equity issue has the potential to increase ownership 
diversification which can expand investor recognition and increase investor demand. Additionally, 
given the large cost firms incur on each share issued, averaging between 20 and 30 percent, it is 
rational for firms to demand meaningful rewards from issuing more shares at the IPO. Some of the 
most important rewards to raising initial equity discussed in the prior literature are visibility and 
investor interest (e.g., Rajan and Servaes, 1997; Cliff and Denis, 2004; Mehran and Peristiani, 
2009; Liu and Ritter, 2011; O’Brien and Tan, 2015). We seek to provide the first evidence on 
whether raising more money at the IPO helps firms achieve greater visibility and investor interest, 
and ultimately, take better advantage of public markets. 
4.1. Main Results 
In Table 5, we directly address the question of how the amount of equity raised in an IPO 
affects post-IPO visibility and investor interest. We use our sample of OAE sensitive issuers, for 
which 30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns represent a relevant and arguably exogenous shock to 
the amount of equity raised, and estimate the second stage 2SLS regression outlined in Eq. 2. The 
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dependent variable in Column 1 is the natural log of analyst coverage at the end of the first year, 
and the dependent variable in Column 2 is the percentage of institutional ownership. Columns 3 
and 4 estimate the same regressions as in Columns 1-2, but examine analyst coverage and 
institutional ownership as of the second year following the IPO.  
Because the dependent variable in Column 1 is logged, the coefficient of 3.29 in Column 
1 suggests that a 1% increase in IPO issue size (i.e., a 0.01 increase in Instrumented OAE) predicts 
an approximate 3.4% increase in the number of analysts during the first year a firm is public. The 
coefficient of 99.2 in Column 2 suggests that the same increase in IPO issue size increases 
institutional ownership percentage by about 1 percentage point, which is about 3% of the sample 
average institutional ownership. Appendix A4 indicates similar estimates using firm-specific betas 
to define the OAE sensitive sample.18   
In Columns 3-4, we examine whether the effects of raising more capital at the IPO grow 
over time after the IPO. Columns 3-4 are estimated in the same fashion as Columns 1-2, but the 
dependent variables are measured during or at the end of the second year a firm is public. We 
continue to find a positive relation between initial offering amount and post-IPO visibility and 
investor interest, but with even larger magnitudes than those in the first year. In Figure 3, we 
perform an analysis similar to Table 5, but at the quarterly level, to more precisely examine 
whether the effect of IPO proceeds on post-IPO visibility and investor interest is indeed increasing 
in the years following a firm’s IPO. In the figure, the x-axis represents the quarter relative to the 
IPO at which the outcome variable is measured. Each point on the line plots the coefficient on 
Instrumented OAE, using the same regression specification as in Table 5. The results in Figure 3 
show that the effect of IPO proceeds on institutional ownership is increases nearly monotonically 
over the first eight quarters that a firm is public, while the effect on analyst coverage levels off 
after the fifth post-IPO quarter.  
                                                          
18 Our results are qualitatively similar when we use three alternative measures of visibility: the number of analyst 
forecasts, share turnover, and breadth of institutional ownership. 
23 
 
The results in Table 5 and Figure 3 are consistent with the idea of feedback effects between 
various dimensions of visibility and investor interest, whereby analyst coverage and institutional 
ownership complement each other. These types of feedback effects are supported by prior research, 
which finds positive relations between analyst coverage, institutional ownership, and also 
liquidity, in a number of contexts.19 Changes to one of these, following changes in the amount 
raised in an IPO, could create a visibility multiplier effect. Identifying exactly channel through 
which investor demand and visibility initially expands is difficult, but one argument consistent 
with theory is that selling a greater portion of the firm increases ownership diversification 
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). This in turn improves liquidity because informed shareholders are 
will to invest in and trade on information, and this then draws in more institutional shareholders 
and increases the demand for analyst research.  
We explore the plausibility of the ownership diversification mechanism more directly in 
Table 6. Specifically, we explore whether one reason that increases in the amount of equity raised 
in an IPO has such large and persistent effects on long-run visibility and investor interest is because 
of the immediate effect increases in IPO proceeds has on ownership dispersion and stock 
liquidity.20 We measure immediate ownership dispersion and stock liquidity using the number of 
institutional owners holding the stock as the second post-IPO quarterly filing, and the average 
daily bid-ask spread over the 60 calendar days preceding the second post-IPO quarterly filing. We 
find large positive effects from increases in the amount of equity raised on initial ownership 
dispersion and stock liquidity. A 1% increase in the amount of IPO equity raised increases the 
number of institutional owners by 4.5% and reduces the bid-ask spread by 5%, relative to the 
average, as of the first post-overallotment-period quarterly filing. 
                                                          
19 See, for example, Irvine (2003), Roulstone (2003); Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004), Chordia, Roll, 
Subrahmanyam (2011); Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012); Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013); Mola, Rau, and Khorana 
(2013); Li and You (2015); and Cao, Gustafson, and Velthuis (2018). 




Taking a step back, the magnitudes of our 2SLS estimates are larger than the corresponding 
OLS estimates. As discussed in Atanasov and Black (2017), such an increase in magnitude can be 
caused by omitted variables or reverse causality in the OLS specification. However, Atanasov and 
Black (2017), along with Jiang (2017), discuss the importance of a clear discussion of the 
economics behind the magnitude of both the change in the coefficient and the resulting 2SLS 
coefficient. One plausible explanation for the larger 2SLS coefficient (relative to the OLS 
coefficient) is that retail investor demand both lowers institutional ownership and makes OAE 
more likely, since evidence suggests that retail investors overpay for IPO shares (see e.g., Dorn, 
2009; Derrien, 2005; Ljungqvist et al., 2006). In this scenario, we would expect our 2SLS analysis, 
which isolates the variation in OAE that is due to fluctuations in NASDAQ returns, to increase the 
magnitude of the OAE coefficient. The substantial marginal rewards to visibility and investor 
interest implied by the 2SLS estimates also make sense given the equivalently high marginal 
issuance costs of IPO shares documented by existing literature (Ritter, 1987; Chen and Ritter, 
2000).  
Collectively, the above evidence suggests that there are large marginal rewards to raising 
additional equity in an IPO. When interpreting this evidence, it is important to recognize that our 
2SLS analysis is a local identification strategy, identifying the effects of IPO issue size on firms 
to the extent that their OAE is sensitive to post-IPO market returns. Appendix A2 shows that, not 
surprisingly, the OAE insensitive firms have fundamentally different initial returns (44.67%, on 
average) as compared to our localized sample (8.13%, on average). Therefore, similar to other 
local identification strategies, such as regression discontinuity design (e.g., Bakke and Whited 
2012), our 2SLS analysis has strong local validity but weaker external validity. Put differently, 
future research is needed to determine whether the visibility and investor interest response to 
increases in the amount of IPO equity raised that we document are similar among IPO issuers with 
different characteristics. 
5. IPO Proceeds and Public Market Access  
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Our finding that increases in the amount of equity raised in an IPO substantially increases 
visibility and investor interest raises the possibility that increases in IPO issue size meaningfully 
affect the probability that firms return to the primary market to conduct a follow-on offering. 
Visibility and investor interest have been shown to reduce the cost of raising equity (Bowen, Chen, 
and Cheng 2008, Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston, 2004, Chemmanur and Yan, 2009). An increase 
in these critical determinants of the cost of equity may increase the likelihood of a seasoned equity 
offering (SEO). For instance, Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2006) find that firms with less analyst 
coverage are more likely to issue debt than equity in subsequent offerings. However, the impact 
of raising more equity in the IPO could have the opposite effect and reduce the likelihood and/or 
size of an SEO because it reduces a firm’s need for subsequent capital.  
To investigate the effect of the amount raised in an IPO on post-IPO equity issuance 
activity, we obtain a comprehensive sample of SEOs from Thomson One’s equity issues database. 
Consistent with Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001), we find that a large percentage of IPO 
issuers raise additional equity in the years following their IPO. Specifically, in our OAE sensitive 
sample, 30% of IPO issuers raise additional equity by the end of year 2 (i.e., two years after their 
first post-IPO quarterly filing). Our first measure of post-IPO equity issuance is an indicator for 
whether a firm conducts an SEO in a particular year. Column 1 and 2 of Table 7 indicate a positive 
relation between IPO proceeds and SEO issuance activity. Specifically, a 1% increase in IPO 
proceeds leads to a 2.5% (1.7%) increase in the likelihood of an SEO in the first (second) year 
following their public market entry.   
Columns 3 and 4 replicate this analysis using the natural log of one plus SEO proceeds 
raised during a year, scaled by IPO proceeds, as the dependent variable. We continue to find a 
positive relation between Instrumented OAE and SEO activity in the two years after a firm is 
public. This result is robust to a variety of transformations, including scaling by total assets instead 
of IPO proceeds or using the natural log of one plus unscaled SEO proceeds.  
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These findings represent, to our knowledge, the first evidence that newly public firms’ 
equity financing decisions are path dependent – raising more initial equity actually induces the 
firm to raise additional equity in the public markets over the subsequent two years. Evidence of 
this effect requires exogenous variation in IPO issue size to rule out the possibility that persistent 
factors, such as investment opportunities, increase both IPO issue size and subsequent equity 
offerings.  
In our final set of tests, we examine whether the positive impact of IPO proceeds on post-
IPO visibility and investor interest culminate with a positive relation between IPO proceeds and 
survival as a public firm. Column 1 of Table 8 presents estimates from a hazard model where the 
dependent variable is the length of time until a firm delists. We find a positive relation between 
30-day post-IPO NASDAQ returns and the life expectancy of a public firm. Column 2 presents 
two-stage estimates using a second stage probit model where the dependent variable indicates 
whether a firm remains listed on a public exchange for at least two years. Again, we find a positive 
relation between the amount of IPO equity raised and survival as a public firm, suggesting a 1% 
increase in IPO proceeds reduces the probability of delisting within the first two years by about 2 
percentage points. These results contribute to existing evidence that analyst coverage, institutional 
ownership, and stock liquidity are important reasons that firms remain public (see e.g., Mehran 
and Peristiani, 2010; Bharath and Dittmar, 2010; Mola, Rau, and Khorana, 2012). In addition, we 
extend the limited literature on post-IPO survival (see e.g., Jain and Kini, 2003; Demers and Joos, 
2007) by suggesting that firms can influence their survival rate by adjusting the amount of equity 
they raise in their IPO. Our collective evidence suggests that the amount of equity raised in an IPO 
is an important determinant of the success of going public by shaping the first-order benefits of 
selling shares to public investors. 
6. Conclusion 
Visibility and investor interest are critical for newly public firms. Failure to attract sufficient 
visibility and investor interest is a major reason that firms opt to leave public markets (Mehran and 
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Peristiani, 2009). One way that IPO issuers can attract post-IPO visibility and investor interest is by 
adjusting the amount of equity raised in their IPO. While there are several reasons increasing the 
amount of equity raised in an IPO could harm aftermarket investor interest given the importance of 
underpricing for investor attention, we find the opposite. We find that increasing the amount of 
equity raised in an IPO drastically improves post-IPO visibility and investor interest, and this appears 
to lower the cost of equity for future equity issuances and extends the amount of time firms remain 
on public exchanges.  
We are able to circumvent empirical challenges in identifying the effect of changes in the 
amount raised in an IPO arising from correlations between the amount of equity raised and 
unobserved factors – such as investor demand and corporate investment opportunities – by 
introducing overallotment option exercise (OAE) as a new source of variation in the amount of 
IPO equity raised. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that market fluctuations in the first 
thirty days after a firm goes public are an important driver of OAE, and thus the amount raised in 
an IPO. We thus provide casual evidence on the effect of marginally increasing the amount raised 
in an IPO on visibility and investor interest, which are critical determinants of the cost of equity.  
While there are several ways increasing the amount raised in an IPO could affect long-run 
post-IPO visibility and investor, we provide evidence that at least one way this occurs is through 
an initial boost to ownership dispersion and liquidity that follows increases in the size of an IPO. 
Our results provide an important benchmark for managers of the benefits of increasing the amount 
raised in an IPO to trade off against the large observable costs, such as underwriter expenses and 
a loss of control (Chen and Ritter, 2000), and unobservable costs, such as the cost of market 
monitoring (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993), that make increasing the amount of equity raised costly 
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Appendix A1: Data Definitions 
Variable Name Variable Definition (source in parentheses) 
   IPO Controls 
OAE The dollar amount of the overallotment option exercised by the lead underwriter within 30 
days of the IPO issue date, as a fraction of IPO proceeds (Thomson One, hand collection). 
Pre-OAE Proceeds Total shares offered times the offer price (excluding the OAE shares), in 2012 dollars 
(Thomson One). 
VC-Backed An indicator variable taking a value of one if the IPO issuer has venture capital funding 
and zero otherwise (Thomson One). 
PE-Backed An indicator variable taking a value of one if the IPO issuer has private equity funding 
and zero otherwise (Thomson One). 
% Primary Percentage of total proceeds raised during the IPO that flow to the company, as opposed 
to initial shareholders (Thomson One). 
Lead Managers Number of unique underwriters in the IPO deal that are listed as lead managers (Thomson 
One). 
Media Attn. The number of searchable news articles that mention a firm over the 30 days preceding 
the firm’s offer date (articles defined as in Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2014)) (Factiva). 
Firm Age Years between a firm’s founding date and its offer date (Field-Ritter founding-dates 
database available on Jay Ritter’s webpage). 
  Firm Controls  
Assets Total assets from the most recent fiscal year prior to the IPO (Compustat). 
MtB Assets plus the market value of equity minus book value of equity minus IPO proceeds, 
all scaled by assets. The market value of equity is measured as total shares outstanding 
times the offer price. Book value of equity and assets are measured as of the most recent 
fiscal year prior to IPO (Compustat). 
Cash/Assets Cash and Cash Equivalents, scaled by total assets, as of the most recent fiscal period prior 
to the IPO (Compustat). 
Net Income/Assets Net income, scaled by total assets, from the most recent fiscal year prior to the IPO 
(Compustat). 
Sale/Assets Total revenue, scaled by total assets, from the most recent fiscal year prior to the IPO 
(Compustat). 
Total Debt/Assets The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities, scaled by total assets, from the 
most recent fiscal year prior to the IPO (Compustat). 
PP&E/Assets Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by total assets, as of the most recent fiscal period 
prior to the IPO (Compustat). 
   Return Controls  
NASDAQ Ret.[-180,-1] The buy-and-hold compounded NASDAQ returns over the six months preceding the IPO 
(CRSP). 
Firm Ret.[0]  The percentage difference between the close on the first day of trading and the firm’s 
offer price (CRSP). 
NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] The buy-and-hold compounded NASDAQ returns over the first thirty days a firm is 
trading (CRSP). 
Ab. Firm Ret.[0,29] The difference between buy-and-hold realized firm returns over the first thirty days a firm 
is trading and the predicted return of the firm over this window, where predicted return of 
the firm is computed as the product of a) the sample-wide sensitivity of firm returns to 
NASDAQ returns over this window (i.e., beta), and b) the realized NASDAQ returns over 
this window (CRSP). 







Appendix A1: Data Definitions (continued) 
Variable Name Variable Definition (source in parentheses) 
   Return Controls  
NASDAQ Ret.[30,59] The buy-and-hold compounded NASDAQ returns over the second month a firm is trading 
(CRSP). 
NASDAQ Ret.[60,89] The buy-and-hold compounded NASDAQ returns over the third month a firm is trading 
(CRSP). 
Outcome Variables – Measured either one or two years after the IPO date 
Ownership Dispersion The total number of unique 13F reporting institutions holding the issuing firm (as of the 
second post-IPO quarterly filing) (Thomson Reuters). 
Liquidity The average daily difference between the closing ask and closing bid, divided by the 
absolute value of the closing price (CRSP) over the sixty days preceding the second post-
IPO quarterly filing. The extreme tails of the sample-wide distribution of daily spreads are 
set to the top and bottom 1% before computing firm-level averages. 
Number of Analysts The total number of sell-side analysts covering the firm over the first four post-IPO 
quarters (or second four post-IPO quarters) (I/B/E/S). 
Institutional Ownership 
Percentage 
The percentage of shares outstanding held by 13F reporting institutions as of either the 4th 
post-IPO quarterly filing, or the eigth quartely filing. 
Post-IPO Media 
Attention 
The number of searchable news articles that mention a firm over the first 30 days 
following the firm’s offer date (articles defined as in Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2014)) 
(Factiva). 
Delistment Rate The number of months from issuance until delistment, or until the end of the sample if the 
firm does not delist before the end of 2016 (CRSP). 
Delist An indicator taking a value of one if the firm delists before its ninth post-IPO quarterly 
filing, and zero otherwise. CRSP delist codes 200-290 (buyouts), (400-490 (liquidations), 
500(removal, reason unavailable), 505-591(removal, reason supplied), and 700 are used to 
indicate delistment (CRSP).  
SEO Indicator An indicator for an SEO during a year (Thomson One). 





Appendix A2: Descriptive Statistics, partitioned by OAE sensitivity 
This table provides descriptive statistics for two subsamples of IPOs with non-missing pre-IPO accounting and 
founding date information, post-IPO return data, and Year 1 outcome information. The left two columns present means 
and medians for issuers with above-median sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns (1,410 issuers) and the 
right two columns presents statistics for below-median issuers (1,427). We estimate sensitivity of OAO exercise to 
NASDAQ returns by computing abnormal firm returns over the first 30 days of trading, with the closest 50% of the 
sample to zero (in absolute value) classified as above median sensitivity. Abnormal firm returns are computed as firm 
returns minus the average cross-sectional equity beta times 30-day NASDAQ returns. The cross-sectional equity beta 
is estimated by regressing initial 30-day firm returns on initial 30-day NASDAQ returns; the beta is the coefficient on 
30-day NASDAQ returns. All variables are defined in Appendix A1. Panel A presents means and medians IPO 
characteristics and pre-IPO firm characteristics (scaled variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%). Panel B 
presents summary statistics on the IPO period return variables (presented as percentages) and Panel C presents 
summary statistics for the main dependent variables.  
Panel A: IPO and Pre-IPO Firm Characteristics 
 High-Sensitivity Low Sensitivity 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
OAE 0.09 0.15 12.05 15.00 
Pre-OAE Proceeds ($ mil.) 172.95 60.06 132.51 68.94 
VC-Backed 0.38 0.00 0.52 1.00 
PE-Backed  0.22 0.00 0.14 0.00 
% Primary 0.87 1.00 0.91 1.00 
Lead Managers 1.43 1.00 1.25 1.00 
Media Attn. 5.26 3.00 7.19 5.00 
Firm Age 19.73 10.00 13.88 7.00 
Total Assets ($ mil.) 1282.15 50.66 650.05 33.16 
MtB 8.94 3.39 16.52 6.87 
Cash/Assets 0.23 0.10 0.28 0.18 
Net Income/Assets  -0.24 0.004 -0.34 -0.03 
Sale/Assets  1.11 0.86 1.18 0.94 
Total Debt/Assets  0.39 0.29 0.35 0.20 
PP&E/Assets  0.21 0.13 0.22 0.14 
 
Panel B: IPO Period Returns 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Pre-Issue Returns 10.11 8.69 13.69 10.64 
Firm Ret.[0] 8.13 4.81 44.67 24.88 
NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] 1.21 1.39 0.77 0.98 
Absolute Firm Abnormal Ret.[0, 29] 10.18 9.46 70.32 44.15 
NASDAQ Ret.[0,360] 15.20 15.47 9.61 14.06 
 
Panel C: Post-IPO Outcomes  
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Ownership Dispersion 33.42 25.00 39.75 34.00 
Bid-Ask Spread 0.023 0.017 0.019 0.013 
     Analysts Year 1 5.10 4.00 6.01 5.00 
Analysts Year 2 6.88 6.00 8.25 7.00 
Institutional Ownership Year 1 36.56 31.96 35.84 32.07 
Institutional Ownership Year 2 41.64 37.01 40.67 35.95 
SEO Indicator Year 1 0.18 0.00 0.26 0.00 
SEO Indicator Year 2 0.19 0.00 0.14 0.00 
Delist Year 2 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.00 
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Appendix A3: Post-IPO NASDAQ Returns and Media Attention 
This table presents OLS results from regressing Post-IPO Media Attention, defined as the number of searchable 
news articles (from Factiva) mentioning a firm in the first 30 days they are public, on compounded NASDAQ 
returns over the first 30 days a firm is trading (i.e., NASDAQ Ret.[0,29]). The sample for both columns is restricted 
to firms with above-median sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns. We estimate sensitivity of OAO 
exercise to NASDAQ returns by computing abnormal firm returns over the first 30 days of trading, with the 
closest 50% of the sample to zero (in absolute value) classified as above median sensitivity. Abnormal firm 
returns are computed as firm returns minus the average cross-sectional equity beta times 30-day NASDAQ 
returns. The cross-sectional equity beta is estimated by regressing initial 30-day firm returns on initial 30-day 
NASDAQ returns; the beta is the estimated coefficient on 30-day NASDAQ returns. In addition to the seven 
control variables listed, each column includes additional control variables for IPO and firm characteristics, which 
are listed and defined in Appendix A1. Each column also includes Fama-French 49 industry and issue year-
quarter fixed effects. T-statistics, using standard errors that are clustered by calendar year-quarter, are reported 
in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Firm Controls Yes Yes 
IPO Controls Yes Yes 
Industry Fes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.584 0.586 





Appendix A4: Effect of IPO Proceeds on Visibility and Investor Interest Firm-Specific Betas 
This table presents second stage 2SLS regressions of post-IPO visibility and investor interest over the first two years 
of trading to estimate the effect of changes in the amount of equity raised in an IPO. The dependent variable in Column 
1 and 3 is the natural log of the number analysts covering the firm. The dependent variable in Column 2 and 4 is the 
percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders. The dependent variables in Columns 1-2 are measured at the 
end of the first year of trading, while the dependent variables in Columns 3-4 are measured at the end of the second 
year. The explanatory variable of interest is Instrumented OAE, which is the fitted value of OAE from Model 2 of 
Table 3. The regression sample for each column is restricted to firms with above-median sensitivity of OAO exercise 
to NASDAQ returns. We estimate sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns by computing abnormal firm 
returns over the first 30 days of trading, with the closest 50% of the sample to zero (in absolute value) classified as 
above median sensitivity. Abnormal firm returns are computed as firm returns minus a firm-specific equity beta times 
30-day NASDAQ returns. Firm-specific equity betas are estimated by taking the trailing 360-day market beta of the 
closest seasoned peer (more than four years of trading history) in terms of book-to-market, conditional on market cap 
being within 30% (Ritter and Welch, 2002). In addition to the four control variables listed, each column includes 
additional control variables for IPO and firm characteristics, which are defined in Appendix A1. Each column also 
includes Fama-French 49 industry and issue year-quarter fixed effects. t-statistics, using standard errors that are 
clustered by calendar year-quarter, are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A: Year 1 Outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ln(Analysts) 
Year 1 




IO %  
Year2 




















































Adj. R-squared 0.578 0.441 0.433 0.369 











Figure 2:  5-Day Return Windows Predicting Long-Run post-IPO Visibility and Investor Interest   
This figure plots coefficients for regressions of analyst coverage and institutional ownership as a function of 
several periods of post-IPO NASDAQ returns, along with the same control variables used in Column 2 of Table 
3. The sample is restricted to our OAE sensitive sample (see Section 2.2). Each line represents a separate 
regression; the dependent variable for the solid line regression is the natural log of the number of analysts 
covering the firm in the second year of trading; the dependent variable for dashed line is the natural log of the 
percentage of shares held by institutional owners two years after going public. Each point on each line represents 
the coefficient for one of the several post-IPO NASDAQ return variables. The ten 5-day post-IPO NASDAQ 
return variables measure cumulative NASDAQ returns over the post-IPO calendar windows of (0,5), (6,10), 
(11,15), (16,20), (21,25), (26,30), (31,35), (36,40), (41,45), (46,50). The first six windows fall within the 
overallotment option period; the last four windows occur after the overallotment option has expired. The left y-
axis measures percent change in analyst coverage; the right y-axis measures percentage point change in 
institutional ownership. The number assigned to each tick mark on the x-axis reflects the post-IPO calendar day 












Figure 3:  Time Series Variation in Post-IPO Visibility and Investor Interest  
This figure plots coefficients for regressions of analyst coverage and institutional ownership as a function of (the 
predicted value of) overallotment exercise, along with the same control variables used in Column 2 of Table 3. 
The dependent variable for green solid line is the number of unique analysts initiating coverage for the firm (i.e., 
Analysts). The dependent variable for the blue line is the percentage of shares held by 13F filers (i.e., IO %). 
Each point on the lines represents the coefficient for overallotment exercise in one of the second stage 
regressions. There are seven total regressions for each measure (e.g., Analysts and IO %), and the dependent 
variable across the seven regressions for a given measure reflects a different post-IPO quarter, as labeled on the 
x-axis (quarter 2 reflects the second post-IPO quarter). Analysts is logged so regression coefficients measure a 
percentage change in y for a 1% change in overallotment exercise; the coefficients in IO % regressions measure 
a percentage point change in institutional ownership for a 100% increase in overallotment exercise. The sample 
of IPO firms is restricted to those with above-median sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns. We 
estimate sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns by computing abnormal firm returns over the first 30 
days of trading, with the closest 50% of the sample to zero (in absolute value) classified as above median 
sensitivity. Abnormal firm returns are computed as firm returns minus the average cross-sectional equity beta 
times 30-day NASDAQ returns. The cross-sectional equity beta is estimated by regressing initial 30-day firm 

































Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the 2,837 IPOs with non-missing pre-IPO accounting and founding 
date information, post-IPO return data, and Year 1 outcome information. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A1. Panel A presents means, medians, and standard deviations of IPO and pre-IPO firm characteristics, and IPO 
period returns (presented as percentages). Scaled variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. Panel B presents 
summary statistics for the main dependent variables.  
Panel A: IPO and Pre-IPO Firm Characteristics 
 Mean Median Std. 
OAE 0.11 0.15 0.06 
Pre-OAE Proceeds ($ mil.)  152.608 65.819 518.744 
VC-Backed 0.448 0.000 0.497 
PE-Backed  0.178 0.000 0.383 
% Primary 0.889 1.000 0.215 
Lead Managers 1.340 1.000 0.822 
Media Attn. 6.232 4.000 12.019 
Firm Age 16.788 8.000 23.082 
Total Assets ($ mil.) 964.204 39.955 9894.082 
MtB 12.749 4.885 24.572 
Cash/Assets 0.254 0.133 0.271 
Net Income/Assets  -0.288 -0.004 0.752 
Sale/Assets  1.142 0.914 1.081 
Total Debt/Assets  0.370 0.245 0.457 
PP&E/Assets  0.214 0.136 0.214 
NASDAQ Ret.[-180,-1] 11.910 9.802 17.516 
Firm Ret.[0] 26.511 11.364 53.335 
NASDAQ Ret.[0,29] 0.984 1.167 7.237 
NASDAQ Ret.[0,360] 12.387 14.943 29.703 
 
Panel B: Post-IPO Outcomes  
 Mean Median Std. 
Ownership Dispersion 36.60 29.00 25.49 
Bid-Ask Spread 0.022 0.014 0.024 
    Analysts Year 1 5.56 5.00 4.25 
Analysts Year 2 7.57 6.00 6.37 
Institutional Ownership Year 1 36.20 32.05 25.53 
Institutional Ownership Year 2 41.15 36.34 28.93 
SEO Indicator Year 1 0.22 0.00 0.42 
SEO Indicator Year 2 0.16 0.00 0.37 








Table 2: OLS Determinants of Post-IPO Outcomes 
This table presents OLS regressions where the dependent variables in Columns 1 & 3 are the natural log of the number 
of analysts initiating coverage (i.e., Ln(Analysts)) in the first and second post-IPO years, and the dependent variable 
in Columns 2 & 4 are the percentage of shares held by institutional owners (i.e., IO %), in the first and second post-
IPO years. All variables are defined in Appendix A1. Each column includes Fama-French 49 industry and issue year-
quarter fixed effects. t-statistics, using standard errors that are clustered by calendar year-quarter, are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 

























































































































































Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.608 0.416 0.502 0.402 




Table 3: First Stage, Determinants of Overallotment Exercise 
This table presents results from regressing overallotment exercise (i.e., OAE) (which ranges from 0.00 to 0.15 
and represents the increase in IPO proceeds attributable to overallotment exercise) on compounded NASDAQ 
returns over the first 30 days a firm is trading (i.e., NASDAQ Ret.[0,29]). Columns 2 and 4 (3 and 5) contain 
subsamples of issuers with above- (below-) median sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns. In each 
column, we estimate sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns by computing abnormal firm returns over 
the first 30 days of trading, with the closest 50% of the sample to zero (in absolute value) classified as above 
median sensitivity. Abnormal firm returns in Columns 2-3 are computed as firm returns minus the average cross-
sectional equity beta times 30-day NASDAQ returns. The cross-sectional equity beta is estimated by regressing 
initial 30-day firm returns on initial 30-day NASDAQ returns; the beta is the estimated coefficient on 30-day 
NASDAQ returns. Abnormal firm returns in Columns 4-5 are computed as firm returns minus a firm-specific 
equity beta times 30-day NASDAQ returns. Firm-specific equity betas are estimated by taking the trailing 360-
day market beta of the closest seasoned peer (more than four years of trading history) in terms of book-to-market, 
conditional on market cap being within 30% (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Each column includes additional control 
variables for issuers’ post-IPO returns, IPO characteristics, and firm characteristics, which are defined in 
Appendix A1. Each column also includes Fama-French 49 industry and issue year-quarter fixed effects. t-
statistics, using standard errors that are clustered by calendar year-quarter, are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 Cross-Sectional Beta  Firm-Specific Beta 








 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
 OAE OAE OAE  OAE OAE 


































































































































Cash/Assets -0.008 -0.011 -0.000  -0.008 -0.010 
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(-1.26) (-1.43) (-0.01) (-0.84) (-1.27) 








































Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.151 0.335 0.176  0.247 0.132 
























Table 4: Initial NASDAQ Returns and Post-IPO Visibility and Investor Interest 
This table presents OLS regressions where the dependent variable in Columns 1 and 3 is the natural log of the 
number of analysts covering the firm (i.e., Ln(Analysts)), and the dependent variable in Columns 2 and 4 of is 
the percentage of shares held institutional shareholders (i.e., IO %). Dependent variables in each column are 
measured as of the fourth post-IPO quarterly filing. The explanatory variables of interest are the compounded 
NASDAQ returns over the first 30 days a firm is trading (i.e., NASDAQ Ret.[0,29]), and the NASDAQ returns 
over the subsequent two thirty day periods (i.e., NASDAQ Ret.[30,59] and NASDAQ Ret.[60,89]). Each column 
includes additional control variables for post-IPO returns as well as IPO and firm characteristics. Columns 1-2 
contain a subsample of issuers with above-median sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns; Columns 
3-4 contain a below-median subsample. We estimate sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns by 
computing abnormal firm returns over the first 30 days of trading, with the closest 50% of the sample to zero (in 
absolute value) classified as above median sensitivity. Abnormal firm returns are computed as firm returns minus 
the average cross-sectional equity beta times 30-day NASDAQ returns. The cross-sectional equity beta is 
estimated by regressing initial 30-day firm returns on initial 30-day NASDAQ returns; the beta is the estimated 
coefficient on 30-day NASDAQ returns. All variables are defined in Appendix A1. Each column also includes 
Fama-French 49 industry and issue year-quarter fixed effects. t-statistics, using standard errors that are clustered 
by calendar year-quarter, are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 High Sensitivity Sample Low Sensitivity Sample 

































Returns Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IPO Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.618 0.650 0.588 0.354 










Table 5: Effect of IPO Proceeds on First and Second Year Visibility and Investor Interest 
This table presents second stage 2SLS regressions of post-IPO visibility and investor interest over the first and 
second year of trading to estimate the effect of changes in the amount of IPO capital raised. The dependent 
variable in Columns 1 and 3 is the natural log of the number analysts covering the firm (i.e., Ln(Analysts)). The 
dependent variable in Columns 2 and 4 is the percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders (i.e., IO %). 
The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 2 are measured at the end of the first year of trading, while the 
dependent variables in Column 3 and 4 are measured at the end of the second year of trading. The explanatory 
variable of interest is Instrumented OAE, which is the fitted value of OAE from Model 2 of Table 3. The 
regression sample for each column is restricted to firms with above-median sensitivity of OAO exercise to 
NASDAQ returns. We estimate sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns by computing abnormal firm 
returns over the first 30 days of trading, with the closest 50% of the sample to zero (in absolute value) classified 
as above median sensitivity. Abnormal firm returns are computed as firm returns minus the average cross-
sectional equity beta times 30-day NASDAQ returns. The cross-sectional equity beta is estimated by regressing 
initial 30-day firm returns on initial 30-day NASDAQ returns; the beta is the estimated coefficient on 30-day 
NASDAQ returns. In addition to the four control variables listed, each column includes additional control 
variables for IPO and firm characteristics, which are defined in Appendix A1. Each column also includes Fama-
French 49 industry and issue year-quarter fixed effects. t-statistics, using standard errors that are clustered by 
calendar year-quarter, are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ln(Analysts) 
Year 1 




IO %  
Year 2 








































Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IPO Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 6: Immediate Effect of IPO Proceeds on Ownership Dispersion and Liquidity 
This table presents second stage 2SLS regressions of the immediate post-IPO effect of changes in the amount of 
IPO capital raised on ownership dispersion and stock liquidity. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the natural 
log of the number of institutional shareholders (i.e., Ownership Dispersion). The dependent variable in Column 
2 is the average daily bid-ask spread as a percentage of price (i.e., Liquidity). The dependent variable in Column1 
is measured as of the second post-IPO quarterly filing, while the dependent variable in Column 2 is averaged 
throughout the 60 days ending at the second post-IPO filing. The explanatory variable of interest is Instrumented 
OAE, which is the fitted value of OAE from Model 2 of Table 3. The regression sample for each column is 
restricted to firms with above-median sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns. We estimate sensitivity 
of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns by computing abnormal firm returns over the first 30 days of trading, with 
the closest 50% of the sample to zero (in absolute value) classified as above median sensitivity. Abnormal firm 
returns are computed as firm returns minus the average cross-sectional equity beta times 30-day NASDAQ 
returns. The cross-sectional equity beta is estimated by regressing initial 30-day firm returns on initial 30-day 
NASDAQ returns; the beta is the estimated coefficient on 30-day NASDAQ returns. In addition to the four 
control variables listed, each column includes additional control variables for IPO and firm characteristics, which 
are defined in Appendix A1. Each column also includes Fama-French 49 industry and issue year-quarter fixed 
effects. t-statistics, using standard errors that are clustered by calendar year-quarter, are reported in parentheses 
below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 (1) (2) 
 Ownership Dispersion Liquidity 




















Firm Controls Yes Yes 
IPO Controls Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FEs Yes Yes 









Table 7: Effect of IPO Proceeds on Future Equity Capital Raising  
This table presents second stage 2SLS regressions estimating the effect of additional IPO proceeds on the 
degree of future equity raising over the first and second year following the IPO. The dependent variables 
in Columns 1 and 2 are indicator variables equaling one if a firm conducts an SEO over the first four 
completed quarters following the IPO (Column 1), or the second set of four completed quarters (Column 
2), and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in Column 3 (4) is the natural log of one plus total SEO 
proceeds raised by the IPO firm during the first (second) four completed quarters following the IPO scaled 
by IPO proceeds. The explanatory variable of interest in each column is Instrumented OAE, which is the 
fitted value of OAE from Model 2 of Table 3. The regression sample for each column is restricted to firms 
with above-median sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns. We estimate sensitivity of OAO exercise 
to NASDAQ returns by computing abnormal firm returns over the first 30 days of trading, with the closest 50% 
of the sample to zero (in absolute value) classified as above median sensitivity. Abnormal firm returns are 
computed as firm returns minus the average cross-sectional equity beta times 30-day NASDAQ returns. The 
cross-sectional equity beta is estimated by regressing initial 30-day firm returns on initial 30-day NASDAQ 
returns; the beta is the estimated coefficient on 30-day NASDAQ returns. In addition to the four control 
variables listed, each column includes additional control variables for IPO and firm characteristics, which 
are defined in Appendix A1. Each column also includes Fama-French 49 industry and issue year-quarter 
fixed effects. t-statistics, using standard errors that are clustered by calendar year-quarter, are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 





















































Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IPO Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 8: Firm Survival 
This table presents Cox and second stage 2SLS regressions explaining variation in the probability of exchange 
delistment after a firm goes public. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the time to delistment (in months) if 
the IPO firm delists before the end of the year 2016, and the number of months until the end of the year 2016 
otherwise. This represents right-censored, single-event survival data. Column 1 is thus estimated using a Cox 
hazard model, which estimates the conditional probability of delistment, given that the firm has survived up to 
a given point. Delistment is measured as exchange removal for negative reasons using CRSP codes 200-290 
(buyout), 400-490 (liquidation), 500 (stopped trading, reason unavailable), 505-591 (stopped trading, reason 
supplied), and 700. The dependent variable in Column 2 is an indicator variable equaling one if the firm delists 
(for the reasons mentioned above) within the first two years of trading and zero otherwise. The explanatory 
variable of interest in Column 1 is the buy-and-hold NASDAQ returns over the first 30 days of trading (i.e., 
NASDAQ Ret.[0,29]), and the main explanatory variable in Column 2 is Instrumented OAE, which is the fitted 
value of OAE from Model 2 of Table 3. The regression sample for each column is restricted to firms with above-
median sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ returns. We estimate sensitivity of OAO exercise to NASDAQ 
returns by computing abnormal firm returns over the first 30 days of trading, with the closest 50% of the sample 
to zero (in absolute value) classified as above median sensitivity. Abnormal firm returns are computed as firm 
returns minus the average cross-sectional equity beta times 30-day NASDAQ returns. The cross-sectional equity 
beta is estimated by regressing initial 30-day firm returns on initial 30-day NASDAQ returns; the beta is the 
estimated coefficient on 30-day NASDAQ returns. In addition to the four control variables listed, each column 
includes additional control variables for IPO and firm characteristics, which are defined in Appendix A1. 
Column 2 also includes Fama-French 49 industry and issue year-quarter fixed effects. t-statistics, using standard 
errors that are clustered by calendar year-quarter, are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 (1) (2) 
 Delistment 
Rate 
Delist within 2 
Years 
























Firm Controls Yes Yes 
IPO Controls Yes Yes 
Industry FEs No Yes 
Year-Quarter FEs No Yes 
Observations 1,410 1,410 
 
